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ENVIRONMENTAL SOFT LAW AS  




ABSTRACT: Soft law governance relies on nongovernmental institutions that establish 
and implement voluntary standards. Compared with traditional hard law solutions to so-
cietal and economic problems, soft law alternatives promise to be more politically feasi-
ble to establish and then easier to adapt in the face of changing circumstances. They may 
also seem more likely to be flexible in what they demand of targeted businesses and other 
entities. But can soft law actually work to solve major problems? This Article considers 
the value of soft law governance through the lens of three major voluntary, nongovern-
mental initiatives that address environmental concerns: (1) ISO 14001 environmental 
management systems; (2) sustainable forest certification systems; and (3) LEED stand-
ards for energy efficient buildings. Taken together, these case studies indicate that, even 
though soft law governance may hold considerable theoretical appeal, it can also be quite 
limited in what it actually achieves. Decision-makers should rely on soft law governance 
only with full recognition of its limitations as well as its alluring characteristics.  
 
CITATION: Cary Coglianese, Environmental Soft Law as a Governance Strategy, 61 
JURIMETRICS J. __–__ (2020). 
 
 The quality of human life depends on maintaining the quality of the natural 
environment. As a result, governmental institutions in the United States—as in 
other developed countries—have responded to the need to protect the environ-
ment by adopting numerous laws and regulations, and by establishing organiza-
tions and programs to enforce them. For example, the U.S. Congress has passed 
several dozen major environmental, natural resource, and energy conservation 
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statutes since the 1970s, including the Clean Air Act,1 the Clean Water Act,2 
and the Energy Policy and Conservation Act.3 In addition, federal agencies such 
as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Department of Energy, and 
U.S. Department of Interior have adopted thousands of regulations implement-
ing legislation with the aim of promoting energy conservation, environmental 
quality, and natural resource protection. A similar pattern of environmental gov-
ernance, one that relies on the enforcement of legislation and regulation, exists 
throughout the developed world.4 
 Yet, despite the proliferation of environmental hard law in the form of leg-
islation and regulation, important environmental concerns persist that still need 
attention and effective governance. For example, the United States has long 
lacked any federal legislation on climate change. Other important environmental 
concerns, such as pollution runoff into waterways and the energy efficiency of 
buildings, have also remained virtually unaddressed by federal law in the United 
States. Looking more broadly around the world, emerging economies still often 
lack the kind of strong public institutions needed to support cost-effective sys-
tems of hard law that can address environmental problems.5 This is true even 
though some of these developing countries face serious environmental prob-
lems, whether from natural resource extraction or from the shift of polluting 
industries from developed to developing countries.  
 In both the developed and developing world, a common response to gaps 
and failings in a hard law approach to environmental governance has been to 
look toward forms of “soft law”—that is, to nonbinding norms and standards 
that aim to promote environmental and natural resource protection.6 Soft law 
                                                                                                                               
 1. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 6(a), § 202, 84 Stat. 1690 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7401). 
 2. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387). 
 3. Pub. L. No. 94-163, § 401(b)(1), 89 Stat. 946 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
6272–6273, 6294). 
 4. See, e.g., U.N. Environment Programme, Environmental Rule of Law: First Global Report, 
U.N. Job No. DEL/2227/NA (Jan. 24, 2019). 
 5. See generally Ruth Greenspan Bell & Clifford Russel, Environmental Policy for 
Developing Countries, ISSUES SCI. TECH., Spring 2002, at 63. 
 6. The concept of “soft law” has seen considerable application and development in the context 
of international or transnational governance, where the diffusion of nonbinding norms stands in 
contrast to the establishment of “hard law” or binding legal standards—such as through treaties. See 
generally Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 
54 INT’L ORG. 421 (2000); Edith Brown Weiss, Voluntary Commitments as Emerging Instruments 
of International Environmental Law, 44 ENV’T POL’Y & L. 83 (2014); Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark 
A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements and Antagonists in International 
Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706 (2010); CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2d ed. 2015); TIM BARTLEY, RULES 
WITHOUT RIGHTS: LAND, LABOR, AND PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2018). But 
the soft law concept also has been applied in the domain of domestic governance. Sometimes this 
takes the meaning of nonbinding sources of normative statements issued by governmental bodies. 
See generally Ryan Hagemann et al., Soft Law for Hard Problems: The Governance of Emerging 
Technologies in an Uncertain Future, 17 COLO. TECH. L.J. 37 (2018); Jamison E. Colburn, Agency 
Interpretations, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 657 (2009); Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons 
from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573 (2008). Often, as in this Article, the term soft 
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approaches can be thought preferable because they at least offer something to 
do when nothing else seems possible. Moreover, it is sometimes suggested that 
soft law can more deeply embed strong norms of environmental responsibility 
in business behavior and more broadly diffuse these same norms across indus-
try, ultimately offering the prospect of more sustained environmental change 
over time.7  
 Whatever the justification for considering soft law, it is important to under-
stand that environmental soft law takes different forms and emanates from dif-
ferent sources. Some of these sources are nongovernmental—that is, private or 
professional standards-setting organizations, or even industry groups or trade 
associations. Other sources are governmental entities themselves, when they 
adopt nonbinding guidance materials or create voluntary programs that encour-
age regulated entities to go beyond compliance with existing regulatory stand-
ards.8 Regardless of the source, environmental soft law seeks to achieve the 
same basic objective as hard law. It seeks to shape individual or business behav-
ior in such a manner as to reduce harmful impacts on environmental conditions, 
such as air quality or levels of toxic pollution in waterways, or the health of 
natural resources, such as forest ecosystems.  
 This Article offers a general consideration of the advantages and disad-
vantages of soft law as an alternative governance strategy to hard law. As should 
be evident by its nonbinding nature, soft law does not demand a great deal of 
public governing institutions, as nongovernmental institutions can be, and often 
are, the primary drivers of environmental soft law. For this reason, soft law strat-
egies will likely be viable even in the face of disagreement and logjams in po-
litical institutions, such as those that prevail within the U.S. Congress on many 
issues.9 The nonbinding nature of soft law also means it does not necessitate the 
same kind of governmental capacity for monitoring and enforcement that hard 
                                                                                                                               
law takes the form of nonstate standards or certification programs—also sometimes called “civil 
regulation,” “entrepreneurial authority,” or, most commonly, “voluntary environmental programs.” 
See generally David Vogel, Private Global Business Regulation, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 261 (2008) 
(“civil regulation”); JESSICA F. GREEN, RETHINKING PRIVATE AUTHORITY: AGENTS AND 
ENTREPRENEURS IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE (2014) (“entrepreneurial authority”); 
Nicole Darnall & Stephen Sides, Assessing the Performance of Voluntary Environmental Programs: 
Does Certification Matter?, in VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE 
(Peter DeLeon & Jorge E. Rivera eds., 2010) (“voluntary environmental programs”). The main con-
cern in this Article is whether or how such voluntary environmental programs can be used as a tool 
to drive the behavior of individuals and business organizations in ways that have a positive impact 
on the environment.  
 7. See generally MICHAEL VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M. GILLIGAN, BEYOND POLITICS: 
THE PRIVATE GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE (2017). For a recent review of empir-
ical studies on social norms and environmental behavior, see Katherine Farrow et al., Social Norms 
and Pro-Environmental Behavior: A Review of the Evidence, 140 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1 (2017). 
 8. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Government Clubs: Theory and Evidence from 
Voluntary Environmental Programs, in VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS: A CLUB THEORY APPROACH 231, 
231–58 (Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakash eds., 2009). 
 9. For discussion of the “logjammed Congress” as it pertains to issues of environmental pro-
tection, see DAVID SCHOENBROD ET AL., BREAKING THE LOGJAM: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
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law demands, making it a potentially viable governance strategy in parts of the 
world that lack well-functioning public sector institutions. Of course, the possi-
bility of adopting soft law when hard law is not feasible does not necessarily 
mean soft law will be superior to hard law; it only means that at times soft law 
may be superior to doing nothing at all. That said, it is theoretically possible 
that, in some cases, soft law could indeed be superior to hard law. The question 
will ultimately be an empirical one.  
 In the Parts that follow, I present case studies of three major nongovern-
mental soft law initiatives related to environmental problems: (1) ISO 14001 
environmental management systems; (2) private certification systems for sus-
tainable forestry; and (3) LEED standards for green building design.10 For each 
of the three case studies, I outline the history of the respective soft law initiative, 
explain how it works, and discuss what can be said about the level of impact 
each has had in terms of industry participation and, where possible, environ-
mental conditions. In all three cases, levels of participation are quite modest and 
the environmental effects seem to be rather small.  
 In the final Part, I draw out issues and lessons about governance that emerge 
from these case studies of soft law as applied to environmental concerns. Al-
though soft law approaches appear to have considerable promise due to their 
greater feasibility of adoption and the flexibility in implementation that they can 
offer, soft law governance can also be quite limited in what it actually achieves. 
Decision-makers should approach soft law governance with their eyes wide 
open to its limitations as well as to its appeal.   
 The aim in offering these three case studies is to help make concrete what 
a soft law approach to governance means and to showcase some of the various 
forms it can take. Choosing between soft law and hard law in any policy area—
including artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, or other new technologies—
will necessitate a consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of each govern-
ance approach.11 It will also be important to pay attention to the details of how 
soft law programs are designed. Just as hard law can vary in its design (e.g., 
performance or ends standards versus means standards),12 soft law can come in 
a variety of shapes and sizes too, even when they share certain commonalities. 
Any policy decision that entails a choice between hard law and soft law will 
benefit from a consideration of the specifics of any proposed legal regime, as 
                                                                                                                               
 10. These three case studies are but a few of many possible examples that could be offered of 
soft law approaches to environmental governance. In no sense can they be said to reflect a repre-
sentative sample of all possible environmental soft law programs or initiatives. They are, however, 
some of the most established and, perhaps most importantly, best-studied examples of environmen-
tal soft law. This makes them appropriate cases to turn to in an effort to distill available lessons from 
common features, possibilities, and impacts of soft law as an environmental governance strategy. 
 11. See generally Gary Marchant, “Soft Law” Governance of Artificial Intelligence, AI PULSE 
(Jan. 15, 2019), https://aipulse.org/soft-law-governance-of-artificial-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/ 
5SN9-KJ B4]; Kenneth W. Abbott et al., Soft Law Oversight Mechanisms for Nanotechnology, 52 
JURIMETRICS J. 279, 279–83 (2012); Hagemann et al., supra note 6. 
 12. See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., DESIGNING SAFETY REGULATIONS FOR 
HIGH-HAZARD INDUSTRIES 30 (2018); NEIL GUNNINGHAM & PETER GRABOSKY, SMART 
REGULATION: DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 53 (1999). 
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well as lessons that can be gleaned from experience with similar regimes and 
approaches. The key to effective decision-making about any form of govern-
ance—soft or hard—is to consider how different options are likely to fare with 
respect to addressing a particular type of problem within a specific institutional 
setting.  
I. ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
 The first case study centers on international standards for environmental 
management systems (EMSs). An EMS is a formal set of plans, procedures, and 
practices that a business or other organization establishes to monitor and im-
prove its overall environmental performance.13 Such a system urges organiza-
tions to take a holistic approach with respect to the environmental impacts of 
their operations—an approach that is thought to be desirable and distinctive. 
Much of hard environmental law tends to be media specific (that is, it comprises 
separate laws for air, water, hazardous wastes, and so forth). But intersections 
and tradeoffs often exist between different media. In the end, it is an organiza-
tion’s overall environmental impacts that matter from the standpoint of public 
health and welfare, and an EMS is intended to help managers focus on—and 
manage—their organizations’ overall environmental performance. As such, 
even in countries that lack any hard mandate for businesses to adopt such sys-
tems for managing their environmental impacts, a soft law surrounding EMSs 
has emerged on the basis of standards adopted by the International Organization 
for Standardization, or ISO.14 
 ISO is an independent, nongovernmental organization based in Geneva. It 
was created in London in 1946 “to facilitate the [international] coordination and 
unification of [industrial] standards.”15 By 2019, ISO had published over 20,000 
standards that provide specifications for products, services, processes, and sys-
tems with the aim of promoting product quality, workplace safety, and opera-
tional efficiency.16 Among ISO’s many sets of standards is one identified as the 
ISO 14000 series on EMSs. ISO 14000 has become globally recognized as ar-
ticulating best practices in the operation of an EMS. The ISO 14000 series 
“maps out a framework that a company or organization can follow to set up an 
                                                                                                                               
 13. Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Environmental Management Systems and the New 
Policy Agenda, in REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE: CAN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
ACHIEVE POLICY GOALS? 1, 1–2 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001). 
 14. ISO’s EMS standards call for organizations to consider how their operations affect “air 
pollution, water and sewage issues, waste management, soil contamination, climate change mitiga-
tion and adaptation, and resource use and efficiency.” INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, 
INTRODUCTION TO ISO 14001:2015, at 3 (2015), https://www.iso.org/files/live/sites/isoorg/files/stor 
e/en/PUB100371.pdf [https://perma.cc/CB8W-UQUZ]. 
 15. Sandrine Tranchard, ISO Celebrates 70 Years, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION (Feb. 
23, 2017), https://www.iso.org/news/2017/02/Ref2163.html [https://perma.cc/VLG7-RKLR]. For 
an overview of the ISO, see Stepan Wood, International Organization for Standardization, in 
BUSINESS REGULATION AND NON-STATE ACTORS: WHOSE STANDARDS? WHOSE DEVELOPMENT? 
82 (Ananya Mukherjee Reed et al. eds., 2012) (ebook). 
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effective environmental management system.”17 This framework is not man-
dated by ISO—indeed, ISO has no governmental, mandatory authority. But 
companies that wish to say that they have adopted the best environmental man-
agement practices will often follow the standards set out by ISO, and they may 
even seek to have a third party certify their EMSs’ conformity with the ISO 
norms. 
 ISO is made up of members from about 165 countries.18 Each participating 
country is represented by a standards organization that elects or appoints repre-
sentatives to be ISO members.19 The U.S. standards organization is the Ameri-
can National Standards Institute (ANSI),20 a nongovernmental organization 
comprised primarily of members from industry and academe. ANSI also in-
cludes representation from governmental bodies, such as the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 
and the Department of Energy.21 Among other countries’ standards organiza-
tions that comprise ISO, some are nongovernmental, like the United States’, 
while others are part of a country’s government. 
 Technical committees develop ISO standards, and these committees, which 
largely operate on the basis of consensus, comprise industrial, technical, and 
business sector experts nominated by members.22 These experts often include 
representatives from relevant businesses, trade associations, government agen-
cies, laboratories, and consumer associations, along with environmental or con-
sumer advocates and university-based researchers.23  
 ISO first adopted its EMS standards in 1996,24 but the impetus for their 
development can be traced to 1987 when “sustainable development” came to be 
expressed as a goal of the World Commission on the Environment and Devel-
opment, a United Nations’ (U.N.) body.25 During a subsequent U.N. conference 
on the environment in Rio De Janeiro in 1992, sustainable development 
reemerged as a principal theme. Out of that 1992 U.N. conference came Agenda 
21, an international compact that encouraged businesses to implement codes that 
                                                                                                                               
 17. ISO 14000 Family—Environmental Management, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, 
https://www.iso.org/iso-14001-environmental-management.html [https://perma.cc/XE9Y-VGQB].  
 18. Members, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, https://www.iso.org/members.html [https: 
//perma.cc/W4YE-Q4QZ].  
 19. Id.; see also INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO MEMBERSHIP MANUAL 6 (2015), https: 
//www.iso.org/files/live/sites/isoorg/files/store/en/PUB100399.pdf [https://perma.cc/L83X-SWQK]. 
 20. Paulette L. Stenzel, Can the ISO 14000 Series Environmental Management Standards 
Provide a Viable Alternative to Government Regulation?, 37 AM. BUS. L. J. 237, 240 (2000). 
 21. Kristyn Wilcox, ISO 14001: An Analysis 17 (2007) (class paper, U.C. San Diego, IR/PS 
CSR Case No. 07-10), https://gps.ucsd.edu/_files/faculty/gourevitch/gourevitch_cs_wilcox.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/W7UG-WNN3]. 
 22. See id. at 18, 35 app. XII; Stenzel, supra note 20, at 240–41. 
 23. See generally Stenzel, supra note 20.  
 24. Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakash, Green Clubs and Voluntary Governance: ISO 14001 
and Firms’ Regulatory Compliance, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 235, 237 (2005). 
 25. Stenzel, supra note 20, at 237. 
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establish “best environmental practice[s].”26 That same year, the British Stand-
ards Institute launched its own nonbinding environmental management stand-
ard.27 The following year, the European Union developed the Eco-Management 
and Audit Scheme (EMAS), a voluntary standard aimed at encouraging busi-
nesses to pursue continuous improvements in their environmental perfor-
mance.28  
 Throughout the early 1990s, “many companies began to realize that the 
public was becoming very concerned about environmental issues, and that 
‘green’ issues were affecting consumer choices as well as investment deci-
sions.”29 Businesses were also interested in possible alternatives to the so-called 
command-and-control nature of hard environmental law, and they saw environ-
mental management systems as a possible substitution for the imposition of ad-
ditional regulatory mandates. If companies could demonstrate that they could 
systematically and responsibly manage their own environmental affairs under 
the EMS rubric, perhaps the pressure for more regulation could be abated.  
 ISO formally began working on developing international EMS standards in 
1992.30 In launching this effort, ISO sought to build upon what had been widely 
perceived as the success of one of its earlier standards, known as ISO 9000, 
which articulated best practices for improving the quality of product manufac-
turing. ISO 9000 was based around what engineers call a “plan-do-check-act” 
model, which originated with the work of Edward Deming in the 1950s.31 The 
plan-do-check-act model organizes internal management around a well-speci-
fied goal and calls for managers to develop plans, policies, and procedures for 
achieving that goal. It also calls for active monitoring of compliance with plans 
and policies, along with ongoing evaluation and adjustment of plans and policies 
in an effort to seek continuous improvement.32 The ISO 9000 standards used 
this model to guide companies in the development of management systems 
aimed at improving the quality of their products and services.33  
 Using ISO 9000 as a model, the ISO’s technical committee on EMSs re-
leased a draft set of standards in 1995 comprising ISO 14001, the standards for 
environmental management systems (EMSs), along with a set of guiding docu-
ments and principles.34 In 1996, the ISO membership formally approved its 
                                                                                                                               
 26. THE EARTH SUMMIT: THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND 
DEVELOPMENT (UNCED) § 30.10, at 430 (Stanley P. Johnson ed., 1993). 
 27. Paula C. Murray, Inching Toward Environmental Regulatory Reform—ISO 14000: Much 
Ado About Nothing or a Reinvention Tool?, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 35, 41 (1999). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 41–42. 
 30. Id. at 42. 
 31. Ronald D. Moen & Clifford L. Norman, Circling Back: Clearing Up Myths About the 
Deming Cycle and Seeing How It Keeps Evolving, QUALITY PROGRESS, Nov. 2010, at 22, 22–28. 
 32. Id. at 26. 
 33. See generally D.H. STAMATIS, UNDERSTANDING ISO 9000 AND IMPLEMENTING THE 
BASICS TO QUALITY (1995). 
 34. Eric Neumayer & Richard Perkins, What Explains the Uneven Take-Up of ISO 14001 at 
the Global Level? A Panel-Data Analysis, 36 ENV’T & PLAN. 823, 825 (2004); Murray, supra note 
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EMS standards.35 Together, the standards and guiding materials call for compa-
nies to follow the plan-do-check-act model with respect to their environmental 
performance.36 They emphasize having companies perform their own internal 
risk analyses and develop their own internal policies—in effect, to regulate 
themselves.37 The ISO 14000 standards do not call for companies to achieve any 
particular level of environmental performance, beyond whatever they may be 
required to achieve under hard law. Instead, the standards set out what is essen-
tially a step-by-step process by which companies set their own goals and seek 
their own ways of managing their environmental impacts, such as by reducing 
the use of water and energy resources or the release of pollution.38 
 If a company so desires, it can seek to have its EMS “certified” by submit-
ting it to a third-party audit. If the company can demonstrate to the auditor that 
its system meets all the ISO standards, the company’s EMS will be deemed to 
be certified.39 Certification does not necessarily mean that a company has met 
any particular level of environmental performance, but it does provide a signal 
that the company’s system conforms to the planning, documentation, and im-
plementation criteria set forth in ISO 14001.40  
                                                                                                                               
 35. Murray, supra note 27, at 42. 
 36. See generally Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Compliance Management Systems: Do 
They Make a Difference?, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF COMPLIANCE (Benjamin van Rooij 
& D. Daniel Sokol eds., forthcoming 2021); Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakash, Do Programs 
Reduce Pollution? Examining ISO 14001's Effectiveness Across Countries, 41 POL’Y STUD. J. 274 
(2013). 
 37. Coglianese & Nash, supra note 8. 
 38. According to ISO’s policies, its standards are reviewed every five years. Since 1996, two 
key sets of revisions to ISO 14000 have been implemented, in 2004 and 2015, respectively. In 2015, 
ISO added new clauses to ISO 14000 standards calling for greater consideration of various stake-
holder interests, enhanced top management responsibilities, and taking into greater account the en-
vironmental impacts of the full life cycle of any products the organization produces—as well as the 
environmental impacts of any outsourcing of activities. ISO 14001:2015, INT’L ORG. FOR 
STANDARDIZATION, https://www.iso.org/standard/60857.html [https://perma.cc/NG47-VP6S]; see 
also Comparison Matrix ISO 14001:2015 vs ISO 14001:2004, AM. SYS. REGISTRAR (Dec. 11, 
2015), http://www.asrworldwide.com/images/Quality_Registrar/Presentations/ISO-14001-2015-2004 
-correlation-matrix.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/20171118051140/http://www.asrworldwide.com 
/images/Quality_Registrar/Presentations/ISO-14001-2015-2004-correlation-matrix.pdf]; ISO 14001: 
2015—Main Changes Since 2004 Edition, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, http://committee.iso. 
org/sites/tc207sc1/home/projects/published/iso-14001---environmental-manage/main-changes.html 
[https://perma.cc/9RKN-72QW]. Other standards have become part of the 14000 series of standards, 
in addition to ISO 14001. ISO 14006, for example, provides voluntary guidelines for incorporating 
eco-design principles into an EMS. ISO 14006:2020 Environmental Management Systems—
Guidelines for Incorporating Ecodesign, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, https://www.iso. 
org/standard/72644.html [https://perma.cc/W272-TVYS]. For a listing of the suite of standards that 
make up the ISO 14000 “family,” see What Is ISO 14001: 2015- Environmental Management 
Systems, ASQ, https://asq.org/quality-resources/iso-14001 [https://perma.cc/Q6BV-C2WS]. 
 39. Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakash, Covenants with Weak Swords: ISO 14001 and 
Facilities’ Environmental Performance, 24 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 745, 751–52 (2005). 
 40. Id. at 750–51. 
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 Over 485,000 certified facilities exist around the world,41 making ISO 
14001 the most well-known of any set of environmental management standards 
and one of ISO’s most popular standards of any kind.42 ISO 14001 allows or-
ganizations to approach environmental management holistically across all types 
of environmental impacts, which makes it possible for organizations of all types, 
sizes, and lines of business to use the standard as a guide for developing an 
EMS.43 ISO does not “guarantee optimal environmental outcomes” from fol-
lowing ISO 14001, but it does claim that doing so will help organizations en-
hance their environmental performance, as well as protect the environment by 
“preventing or mitigating adverse environmental impacts.”44  
 To maintain their certification, facilities must submit annually to third-party 
audits and undertake a complete reassessment of their EMSs every three years.45 
Annual audits are meant to encourage the organization to see the EMS as a long-
term obligation that requires ongoing improvement and compliance.46 During 
the audit, the auditor determines whether the EMS “conforms to planned ar-
rangements for environmental management including the requirements of [ISO 
14001] and has been properly implemented and maintained.”47 To determine the 
organization’s level of compliance with the EMS, the auditor can interview an-
yone within the organization’s workforce, including line workers and managers, 
and seek to assess their understanding of the EMS and its policies and require-
ments.48 Depending on the size of the organization, audits can last anywhere 
from “a few weeks to several months.”49  
 Third-party auditors are required to receive accreditation from an organiza-
tion certified by an ISO-recognized accreditation authority.50 To ensure auditors 
                                                                                                                               
 41. ISO Survey 2019 Results—Number of Certificates and Sites per Country and the Number 
of Sector Overall, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, https://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?func=ll 
&objId=18808772&objAction=browse&viewType=1 (choose “1. ISO Survey 2019 results—num-
ber of certificates and sites per country and the number of sector overall”; then click “Open” to view 
the spreadsheet; then click the “Overview” tab) (last visited Dec. 28, 2020). 
 42. See Potoski & Prakash, supra note 24, at 235 (“ISO 14001 is perhaps the most important 
and visible voluntary environmental program . . . .”). 
 43. ISO 14001:2015, supra note 38; INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, supra note 14. 
 44. ISO 14001:2015(en) Environmental Management Systems—Requirements with Guidance 
for Use, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:14001:ed-
3:v1:en; see ISO 14001:2015, supra note 38. 
 45. See INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, supra note 14, at 7; see also ISO 14001:2015, 
supra note 38. 
 46. See NSF INT’L, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: AN IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE 
FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ORGANIZATIONS 53 (1996), https://www3.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/fin 
algu.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GCA-NAD3]; see also ISO 14001:2015, supra note 38. 
 47. See Edwin Pinero, Introduction to EMS Auditing Concepts and ISO 14000, OFF. FED. 
ENV’T EXEC., at 2, https://www.fedcenter.gov/_kd/Items/actions.cfm?action=Show&item_id 
=660&destination=ShowItem [https://perma.cc/W89M-ZNGZ] (citing Section 4.5.4 of ISO 14001 
and providing an in-depth explanation of the ISO 14000 auditing process). 
 48. Potoski & Prakash, supra note 39, at 752. 
 49. Id. 
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are competent, the accreditation authority “performs an on-site audit of the au-
ditor by witnessing how an auditor goes about certifying a facility.”51 To prevent 
conflicts of interest, auditors are prohibited from performing outside consulting 
work for an organization pursuing certification.52 The competence of the auditor 
is further ensured through complete reassessments of the auditor that are per-
formed every four years.53 Furthermore, during the first six months of an audi-
tor’s accreditation, the accreditation authority conducts additional surveillance 
audits, and then it performs annual oversight audits for the next three years.54 
Auditor training requirements and accountability to a third-party accreditation 
authority are intended to encourage organizations seeking ISO 14001 certifica-
tion to respect their auditor and take their recommendations seriously. 
 Despite the advantages of the ISO third-party audit system, it should not be 
viewed as entirely unproblematic. For one, third-party auditing can be expen-
sive, reportedly costing anywhere from $25,000 to over $100,000 per facility.55 
For another, it is not clear what certification really means. A failed certification 
audit does not lead to any sanctions by ISO, other than the theoretical possibility 
of a loss of certification.56 Such a loss, however, is hardly a realistic possibil-
ity.57 As long as a company corrects any nonconformances, it can still receive 
its certification.58 Moreover, the results of the audit, although shared with top 
management,59 are not subject to public disclosure,60 perhaps giving organiza-
tions little reason to take audit findings as seriously as some might like.61 
 Patterns of EMS certification vary greatly around the world. Over ninety 
percent of all ISO-certified facilities can be found in Europe and Asia.62 As of 
2019, ISO reported a total of only about 7,500 certified facilities belonging to 
about 3,600 businesses or other organizations in the United States.63 To put this 
number of certified facilities in perspective, consider that the United States had 
a total of 290,092 manufacturing establishments in 2018, out of a total of ap-
proximately 7.9 million business establishments overall.64 According to EPA 
                                                                                                                               
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 752–53. 
 53. Id. at 753. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 752. 
 56. Id. at 749; see also Aseem Prakash & Matthew Potoski, International Standards 
Organization as a Global Governor: A Club Theory Perspective, in WHO GOVERNS THE GLOBE? 
72, 94 (Deborah D. Avant et al. eds., 2010). 
 57. Y. BEEJADHUR, INT’L TRADE CTR., BULL. NO. 78, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISO 14000 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 13 (2007). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Pinero, supra note 47, at 2. 
 60. Potoski & Prakash, supra note 39, at 749. 
 61. Id. at 748. 
 62. ISO Survey 2019 Results—Number of Certificates and Sites per Country and the Number 
of Sector Overall, supra note 41 (click the “ISO 14001” spreadsheet tab). 
 63. Id. 
 64. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2018 CBP AND NES COMBINED REPORT (2020), https://www.census. 
gov/data/tables/2018/econ/nonemployer-statistics/2018-combined-report.html (follow “U.S. & States” 
hyperlink). 
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data, at least 370,000 facilities in the United States have enough of an environ-
mental impact to require permits under the Clean Air Act or the Clean Water 
Act.65 This means that the proportion of U.S. businesses with ISO-certified 
EMSs is a tiny fraction—about 2 percent or less—of all of the facilities that 
could presumably benefit from an EMS. Of course, it is the case that some com-
panies will use EMSs that were developed to meet ISO 14001’s criteria but will 
never seek formal certification. The number of such firms, though, is unknown, 
precisely because they never seek certification. 
 When it comes to the efficacy of the ISO 14001 standards in inducing firms 
to make environmental improvements, many companies that have used these 
standards to develop an EMS report making substantial gains in their overall 
environmental performance by lowering pollution, energy consumption, or wa-
ter usage.66 Yet it is far from clear that the companies that trumpet their im-
provements are representative of all polluting companies with an EMS. It is 
possible that many more firms with such systems do not make such substantial 
gains. It is also possible that many companies without an EMS also make sub-
stantial improvements in their environmental performance, even if they are not 
as vocal about doing so.67  
 In addition, some concern exists that companies can comply with ISO 
14001 and other process-based standards simply by going through the motions. 
It is one thing to have an EMS that conforms to the various paperwork require-
ments of ISO 14001—such as a stated environmental policy, a set of written 
procedures, and routinely maintained documentation—but it is another for a 
company to set and attain ambitious environmental goals.68  
                                                                                                                               
 65. The agency’s main enforcement database—known as ECHO—is very dynamic. As of De-
cember 15, 2020, it listed 183,626 facilities with Clean Air Act permits and 370,492 facilities with 
a Clean Water Act permit. The total number of facilities with a permit under either of these statutes 
is surely larger than 370,492, as some facilities may only have a Clean Air Act permit. Facility 
Search Results, ECHO, https://echo.epa.gov/facilities/facility-search?mediaSelected=all (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2020) (using search types “Air” and “Water”). 
 66. For a discussion of survey research finding that companies report making environmental 
improvements following ISO certification, see Olivier Boiral et al., Adoption and Outcomes of ISO 
14001: A Systematic Review, 20 INT’L J. MGMT. REVS. 411 (2018); Pavel Castka & Charles J. 
Corbett, Management Systems Standards: Diffusion, Impact and Governance of ISO 9000, ISO 
14000, and Other Management Standards, 7 FOUNDATIONS & TRENDS TECH. INFO. & OPERATIONS 
MGMT. 161, 251–53 (2015). Notably, Boiral et al.’s review of the peer-reviewed literature indicates 
that “the causes of performance improvements other than ISO certification and the questionable 
reliability of the indicators analyzed are rarely addressed” by researchers. Boiral et al., supra at 426. 
 67. Some empirical research suggests that companies that come forward to trumpet their en-
vironmental progress are simply more extroverted than they are necessarily more environmentally 
responsible. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Performance Track’s Postmortem: Lessons 
from the Rise and Fall of EPA’s “Flagship” Voluntary Program, 38 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 1 (2014); 
Jennifer A. Howard-Grenville, Jennifer Nash, & Cary Coglianese, Constructing the License to 
Operate: Internal Factors and their Influence on Corporate Environmental Decisions, 30 LAW & 
POL’Y 73 (2008). 
 68. The concern that managers may simply go through the motions when implementing a man-
agement system has been expressed in a variety of ways. See, e.g., NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, 
& MED, supra note 12, at 111 (“pencil-whipping”); Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen, 
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 More empirical research has been conducted on the impact of ISO 14001 
than probably any other form of nongovernmental soft law related to the envi-
ronment.69 It turns out, though, that discerning the impact of ISO 14001 is not a 
straightforward task for two principal reasons.  
 First, because ISO 14001 is a form of soft law, it is voluntary, which means 
that those companies opting to establish an EMS and seek ISO certification are 
not a random sample of all companies. They may well make environmental 
gains, but those gains may be due less to ISO 14001, or to an EMS, than to the 
fact that these companies are more environmentally committed than other com-
panies. Indeed, the very fact that a company has decided to create an EMS and 
seek ISO 14001 certification might well suggest that the company’s leaders are 
more committed to responsible environmental management.70  
 Second, the holistic nature of ISO 14001 means that it is not designed with 
any particular environmental goal in mind. The flexibility that ISO 14001 af-
fords companies in choosing their own goals means that one company may try 
to conserve water resources while another company may try to reduce hazardous 
waste generation. As such, if different companies use ISO 14001 and EMSs to 
pursue different goals, no single research metric of environmental performance 
can be said to represent ISO 14001’s intended impact. 
 Political scientists Aseem Prakash and Matthew Potoski have done perhaps 
the best job of overcoming these limitations.71 They address the selection bias 
problem created by the voluntary nature of ISO-certification by using sophisti-
cated statistical analysis.72 They tackle the metric problem by using two cross-
cutting dependent variables: (1) regulatory compliance, and (2) overall releases 
of toxic chemicals (whether into the air, water, or ground).73 As a result, when 
                                                                                                                               
(2009) (“window dressing”); Garry C. Gray & Susan S. Silbey, Governing Inside the Organization: 
Interpreting Regulation and Compliance, 120 AMER. J. SOCIO. 96, 117 (2014) (“Potemkin vil-
lages”). 
 69. For a sampling of such research, see Aseem Prakash & Matthew Potoski, Global Private 
Regimes, Domestic Public Law: ISO 14001 and Pollution Reduction, 47 COMPAR. POL. STUDS. 369 
(2014); Pieter de Jong et al., The Financial Impact of ISO 14001 Certification: Top Line, Bottom-
Line, or Both?, 119 J. BUS. ETHICS 119 (2014); Potoski & Prakash, supra note 39; Aseem Prakash 
& Matthew Potoski, Voluntary Environmental Programs: A Comparative Perspective, 31 J. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 123 (2012); Toshi H. Arimura et al., Is a Voluntary Approach an Effective 
Environmental Policy Instrument? A Case for Environmental Management Systems, 55 J. ENV’T 
ECON. & MGMT. 281 (2008); Dennis Rondinelli & Gyula Vastag, Panacea, Common Sense, or Just 
a Label? The Value of ISO 14001 Environmental Management Systems, 18 EUR. MGMT. J. 499 
(2000); RICHARD N.L. ANDREWS ET AL., DEP’T OF PUBLIC POL’Y, UNIV. OF NORTH CAROLINA AT 
CHAPEL HILL, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: DO THEY IMPROVE PERFORMANCE?, 
PROJECT FINAL REPORT: VOL. II, at 285 (2003); Oren Perez et al., The Dynamic of Corporate Self-
Regulation: ISO 14001, Environmental Commitment, and Organizational Citizenship Behavior, 43 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 593 (2009); Vera Ferrón Vílchez, The Dark Side of ISO 14001: The Symbolic 
Environmental Behavior, 23 EUR. RES. MGMT. & BUS. ECON. 33 (2017). 
 70. See generally Jonathan C. Borck & Cary Coglianese, The Effectiveness of Voluntary 
Environmental Programs, 34 ANN. REV. ENV’T & RES. 305, 311, 316 (2009).  
 71. ASEEM PRAKASH & MATTHEW POTOSKI, THE VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTALISTS: GREEN 
CLUBS, ISO 14001, AND VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS (2006). 
 72. Id. at 148, 156–64. 
 73. Id. at 150–52. 
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they find that ISO‐certified facilities do a statistically significant better job than 
other facilities in terms of time spent in compliance with environmental regula-
tions and in terms of reductions in reported toxic releases, Prakash and Potoski 
can be reasonably assured that their results are real. And yet, while their results 
are statistically significant, these results are also substantively underwhelming. 
After controlling for other factors, Prakash and Potoski find that, compared with 
facilities without an ISO‐certified EMS, certified “facilities spent on average 
one week less time out of compliance with government regulation.”74 In terms 
of toxic emissions, Prakash and Potoski’s results are self-admittedly “difficult 
to interpret,” but they also acknowledge that at best what they find “is not a very 
large improvement difference.”75 If toxic emissions are normally distributed 
across all firms, Prakash and Potoski’s analysis shows that ISO‐certified facili-
ties perform at most only about three percentiles better than noncertified facili-
ties.76 
II. SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY PRACTICES 
 Standards for sustainable forestry practices are another prominent example 
of soft law related to environmental protection. As with EMSs, for which there 
have existed multiple soft law standards (e.g., EMAS and the British standard, 
in addition to the dominant ISO 14001 paradigm), forest managers in the timber 
industry have multiple options from which to choose if they wish to follow soft 
law. Around the world, dozens of voluntary forest sustainability standards and 
standard-setting bodies exist.77 In this Part, the focus is on the two main non-
governmental forestry standards applicable within the United States: (1) the For-
est Stewardship Council (FSC), an international organization that runs a 
sustainable forestry certification system initially launched by the World Wild-
life Fund but which now comprises both industry groups and other environmen-
tal organizations as members, and (2) the Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI), 
                                                                                                                               
 74. Id. at 166. 
 75. Id. at 165–66. 
 76. Cary Coglianese, Book Review, 42 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 932, 933 (2008). Moreover, the 
modest regulatory compliance improvements might have come about merely from firms doing a 
better job at handling paperwork requirements, not by actually improving substantive environmental 
performance. Id. With respect to toxic pollution, the data on this measure are self-reported, so any 
slight improvement in these numbers might have come about simply from better internal accounting. 
Id. Improvement in both internal accounting and paperwork handling are precisely the kind of ef-
fects that a process-based EMS could be expected to deliver—but they are different than making 
tangible improvements in environmental quality.  
 77. Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) Toolbox, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.fao.org/sustainable-forest-management/toolbox/modules/forest-certification/in-more-d 
epth/en/ [https://perma.cc/SA9C-VGGB] (“Today, there are more than 50 certification schemes ad-
dressing a wide variety of forest types, tenure and management regimes.”). For an overview of the 
certification approach to forest management, see Graeme Auld et al., Certification Schemes and the 
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a program initially created by the American Forest & Paper Association (an in-
dustry trade association).78  
 Both of these programs emerged in the mid-1990s following international 
recognition of the need for greater attention to sustainable forest management—
particularly for the preservation of rainforests around the world. Sustainable for-
estry was a major concern expressed at the United Nations conference on envi-
ronment in Rio De Janeiro in 1992, the same meeting that helped to spur interest 
in EMSs. But no binding international agreement related to sustainable forestry 
could be reached at the Rio summit. Instead, nations agreed to a nonbinding 
“Statement of Principles on Forests” that generally encouraged countries to do 
a better job of monitoring and managing the conservation of their forest re-
sources.79 Furthermore, in the years following the summit, nations met in what 
has come to be known as the Montréal Process.80 This process catalyzed the 
development of criteria and indicators that are now widely accepted as the basis 
for evaluating the health of forests around the world, although no binding inter-
national standards exist that mandate the attainment of any particular level on 
these criteria or indicators.81 
 Some countries have established hard law requirements related to forest 
management, but a large number of countries, especially in the developing 
world, still lack a viable hard law-based governance infrastructure for forest 
management. This is also largely the case for many forested lands in the United 
States. Although forestry practices on many public lands must comply with var-
ious federal statutes and regulations related to multiuse management, only 31 
percent of the United States’ forestlands are owned by the federal government 
and thus are subject to these hard law requirements.82  
                                                                                                                               
 78. Although SFI focuses on forests in the United States and Canada, FSC is a major global 
forest certification system as well. Another major global forest certification is the Programme for 
the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC), which originated in 1998 as a system known as 
Pan-European Forest Certification but has since expanded well beyond Europe. See Auld et al., 
supra note 77, at 191. See generally PROGRAMME FOR ENDORSEMENT FOREST CERTIFICATION, 
https://www.pefc.org/ [https://perma.cc/ZX4Q-CRJW]. SFI has been endorsed by PEFC and is a 
member of its global alliance of certification systems. See Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI), 
PROGRAMME FOR ENDORSEMENT FOREST CERTIFICATION, https://pefc.org/discover-pefc/our-pefc-
members/national-members/sustainable-forestry-initiative-sfi [https://perma.cc/KZ59-HQQX]. 
 79. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Statement of Principles for 
a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types 
of Forests, 31 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 881–87 (1992). 
 80. Montréal Process, U.S. FOREST SERV., https://www.fs.fed.us/research/sustain/montreal-
process.php [https://perma.cc/285H-H34H]. 
 81. See, e.g., About Us, MONTRÉAL PROCESS, https://www.montrealprocess.org/The_Mont 
real_Process/About_Us/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/8AHB-VZ7K].  
 82. National Woodland Owner Survey, U.S. FOREST SERV., https://www.fia.fs.fed.us/nwos/ 
[https://perma.cc/2E8C-NR39]; see also FS Directive 979, National Report on Sustainable Forests—
2010 (U.S.D.A. 2011), https://www.fs.fed.us/research/sustain/docs/national-reports/2010/2010-sus 
tainability-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DFT-MQFR]. The remaining forestlands—owned by indi-
viduals, corporations, states, municipalities, and tribal governments—are not subject to these federal 
forest management requirements. After all, the National Forest Management Act, as its very name 
indicates, applies only to “units of federally owned forest, range, and related lands throughout the 
United States and its territories.” 16 U.S.C §§ 1608–1609. Of course, even though federal forest 
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 As concern about forest sustainability has grown, especially due to climate 
change, some consumers of wood and paper products have started to demand 
products that have been sustainably harvested. The absence of hard law related 
to forest management in developing countries and over large portions of forests 
in developed countries such as the United States has led to increased interest in 
soft law methods of governing forest management. SFI and FSC emerged within 
this milieu.83 Both of these soft law programs allow forest product manufactur-
ers to display a certification label on those products that derive from forests 
managed in a manner that meets the relevant voluntary standards.84  
 As will be evident, both sets of standards have considerable commonalities, 
but a brief distillation of these two initiatives and their specific standards helps 
to showcase additional ways that soft law has emerged to address environmental 
concerns. This Part concludes with a discussion of what can be said about the 
impact of FSC and SFI on the sustainability of forest resources in the United 
States and globally. 
A. Forest Stewardship Council  
 The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) is the most widely adopted forest 
certification system in the world. Established in 1993 by the World Wildlife 
Fund and other organizations out of concern for rampant deforestation, FSC is 
now an independent voluntary program that sets standards for responsible forest 
management around the world.85 Its standards are developed to address the fol-
lowing ten principles or objectives:86 
1. Compliance with laws and FSC principles; 
2. Tenure and use rights and responsibilities; 
3. Indigenous peoples’ rights; 
4. Community relations and workers’ rights; 
5. Benefits from the forest; 
                                                                                                                               
management rules do not apply to state and local forests, many (but not all) states do have their own 
laws for managing their public forests. See, e.g., DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, STATE FORESTRY LAWS 
(2000), https://defenders.org/sites/default/files/publications/state_forestry_laws.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/R26X-KN9D]. Even so, more than half of forestlands in the United States—57 percent—are 
owned by private individuals or entities not subject to any systemic, hard forest management re-
quirements. See National Woodland Owner Survey, supra. 
 83. See generally Errol E. Meidinger, The New Environmental Law: Forest Certification, 10 
BUFF. ENV’T L. J. 211 (2002). 
 84. See generally id. 
 85. Our History, U.S. FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://us.fsc.org/en-us/who-we-are/o 
ur-history [https://perma.cc/M5F3-HLYX]. See generally BENJAMIN CASHORE ET AL., GOVERNING 
THROUGH MARKETS: FOREST CERTIFICATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF NON-STATE AUTHORITY 
(2004).  
 86. Mission and Vision, U.S. FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://us.fsc.org/en-us/what-
we-do/mission-and-vision [https://perma.cc/BS4Z-W5MD] [hereinafter Mission and Vision]. The 
listed principles provided in the text of this Article are taken verbatim from FSC’s headings for each 
principle. Each heading is then followed by a short elaboration of the applicable principle. For ex-
ample, the heading for Principle 4, on community relations and workers’ rights, is followed with 
this statement: “Forest management operations shall maintain or enhance the long-term social and 
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6. Environmental impact; 
7. Management plan; 
8. Monitoring and assessment; 
9. Maintenance of high conservation value forests; and 
10. Plantations.  
Addressing these topics, FSC sets out standards for both forest management 
certification and chain-of-custody certification—the latter to ensure that prod-
ucts sold with the FSC certification label were indeed sourced with products 
from forests that hold an FSC management certification.87  
 To obtain certification in either forest management or chain of custody, for-
est managers must show that their operations adhere to FSC’s global principles 
and to the standards that give more specific meaning to these principles.88 De-
tails of FSC’s standards can vary somewhat regionally based on variation in 
forest conditions and needs in different parts of the world, but they all address 
each of the ten principles listed above.89 For each principle, standards specify 
both criteria for conformity and indicators of that conformity.90  
 The FSC forest management standard for the United States, for example, 
elaborates FSC’s Principle 4, on community relations and workers’ rights, with 
five “criteria,” each of which specify the principle in greater detail.91 The second 
of the Principle 4 criteria, for instance, states that “[f]orest management should 
meet or exceed all applicable laws and/or regulations covering health and safety 
of employees and their families.”92 Each criterion is then followed by one or 
more indicators against which conformity with the applicable criterion can be 
assessed. For example, the second criterion for Principle 4 is followed by three 
indicators, one of which holds that “[t]he forest owner or manager and their 
employees and contractors demonstrate a safe work environment. Contracts or 
other written agreements include safety requirements.”93 
 As this example from the U.S. version of the FSC standard indicates, some 
of FSC’s principles, criteria, and indicators weave soft law together with hard 
                                                                                                                               
 87. See generally Certification, U.S. FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://us.fsc.org/en-
us/certification [https://perma.cc/P3C9-DW9Q]. 
 88. See, e.g., Become Certified, U.S. FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://us.fsc.org/en-
us/certification/become-certified [https://perma.cc/UCM8-MQ8D]; U.S. FOREST STEWARDSHIP 
COUNCIL, FSC-STD-01-001 V5-2 EN, FSC PRINCIPLES AND CRITERIA FOR FOREST STEWARDSHIP 
9 (2015). 
 89. FSC’s standards for individual countries can be found by using the search tool at Document 
Centre, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://fsc.org/en/document-centre [https://perma.cc/W46 
5-ZLRP]. Even within individual countries, regional variation is allowed for different types of forest 
ecosystems. 
 90. On the general structure of FSC’s standards and auditing for compliance, see Steven 
Bernstein & Benjamin Cashore, Non-State Global Governance: Is Forest Certification a Legitimate 
Alternative to a Global Forest Convention?, in HARD CHOICES, SOFT LAW: VOLUNTARY 
STANDARDS IN GLOBAL TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE 33, 39 (John J. Kirton 
& Michael J. Trebilcock eds. 2004). 
 91. U.S. FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, FSC-US FOREST MANAGEMENT STANDARD (V1.0), 
at 14–18 (2010).  
 92. Id. at 18. 
 93. Id.  
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law. FSC’s very first principle—compliance—does so quite explicitly. That 
principle is, in turn, elaborated by six criteria and a total of ten indicators, each 
of which aim at compliance with hard law.94 One criterion for compliance, for 
instance, calls for forest managers to “respect” all applicable laws.95 That crite-
rion of respect is given more specific meaning with indicators that call for forest 
managers to develop plans that demonstrate compliance96 and to train employ-
ees and contractors in applicable laws.97  
 Other FSC principles, criteria, and indicators, of course, have much less 
direct connection with hard law. For example, Principle 7 on management plans 
states: “A management plan—appropriate to the scale and intensity of the oper-
ations—shall be written, implemented, and kept up to date. The long-term ob-
jectives of management, and the means of achieving them, shall be clearly 
stated.”98 This principle is followed by numerous, more concrete criteria and 
indicators describing what exactly should be included in a management plan— 
such as an indication that it will be regularly updated, a specification that em-
ployees will receive adequate training to implement a forest’s management plan, 
and an intention to make a summary of the plan publicly available.99  
  The FSC does not make the determination itself to issue certificates. In-
stead, it accredits independent certification bodies that carry out the assessments 
that lead to FSC certification.100 Certification means that a specific forest or for-
est products business has complied with FSC standards. FSC makes the claim 
that it is “the only global forest certification system to have an integrated ac-
creditation program that systematically checks its certification bodies.”101 To-
ward this end, FSC has established a process for checking annually on 
accredited certification bodies. Of course, decisions about the selection and re-
numeration of the accrediting body are ultimately made by the forest businesses 
seeking certification. 
 FSC’s standards derive from a process driven by its membership, which 
falls into the following three categories:  
                                                                                                                               
 94. Id. at 7–10. 
 95 . Id. at 7. 
 96. Id. 
 97 . Id. 
 98. Id. at 59.  
 99. Id. at 59–69. See generally U.S. FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, HOW FSC FOREST 
MANAGEMENT DIFFERS FROM STANDARD PLANS (2011), https://us.fsc.org/preview.how-fsc-forest-
management-differs-from-standard-plans.a-318.pdf [https://perma.cc/5K8H-E3CQ]. 
 100. Certification Body Accreditation, U.S. FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, 
https://fsc.org/en/page/certification-body-accreditation [https://perma.cc/D2EW-3PHK]. Currently, 
there are about a dozen accredited certifiers for forests in the United States. Certifying Bodies in the 
US, U.S. FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://us.fsc.org/en-us/certification/certifying-bodies-
in-the-us [https://perma.cc/EV9U-BX92]. 
 101. Certification Body Accreditation, supra note 100. In addition, certifications for busi-
nesses and accreditation for certification bodies can be suspended if audits or assessments reveal 
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• Economic: “forestry firms, secondary processors and retailers, auditing or-
ganizations, and consultants;”102 
• Social: “civil society groups and individuals who represent community de-
velopment, poverty, and human and worker rights organizations;”103 and 
• Environmental: environmental advocacy groups.104  
Groups in each category form a “chamber,” and FSC ensures that it also has 
representation from the global North and South within each chamber.105 Mem-
bership and voting rights are organized with the aim of ensuring “equal weight 
of vote and influence for the different interest groups as well as for different 
parts of the world and economic power.”106 FSC operates with an active Board 
of Directors comprising twelve members elected from each sub-chamber of the 
General Assembly.107 A Director General runs day-to-day operations and is ac-
countable to a Board of Directors.108 FSC elects its Board through votes of a 
General Assembly that meets every three years and uses a voting process that 
ensures equality among each of the three main groups.109 
 Standards must ultimately be approved by the Board of Directors, but only 
after a lengthy process that begins with drafting efforts performed by a standards 
development group comprising members from all three chambers along with 
various technical experts.110 Draft standards are then subjected to a consultative 
process, including notice and comment.111 They may also be subjected to appro-
priate field testing and independent auditing.112 Only after consultation and any 
testing will a final report be submitted to a designated FSC Policy and Standards 
Unit for formal approval by the FSC Board of Directors.113 Even after they are 
approved, standards are subject to the possibility of petitions for change and 
review.114 FSC’s principles, and its various criteria and indicators for forest 
                                                                                                                               
 102. Christine Overdevest, Codes of Conduct and Standard Setting in the Forest Sector—
Constructing Markets for Democracy?, 59 RELS. INDUSTRIELLES 172, 179 (2004). 
 103. Id. at 179–80. 
 104. Id. at 180. 
 105. Membership Chambers, U.S. FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://us.fsc.org/en-us/ 
who-we-are/membership/membership-chambers [https://perma.cc/T2QB-A7YE]. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Strategic Plan & Governance Structure, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://www. 
fsc.org/en/governance-strategy [https://perma.cc/TMS9-9QVP]. 
 108. Governance, U.K. FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://www.fsc-uk.org/en-uk/about 
-fsc/who-is-fsc/governance [https://perma.cc/3GKM-D7QF]. 
 109. Governance, U.S. FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://us.fsc.org/en-us/who-we-
are/governance [https://perma.cc/TSQ7-L37M]. 
 110. See generally U.S. FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, FSC-PRO-01-001 V3-1 EN, THE 
DEVELOPMENT AND REVISION OF FSC NORMATIVE DOCUMENTS (2015).  
 111. See id. §§ 3.14–3.16, 5.1–5.13, at 13–15. 
 112. See id. § 6, at 15 (citing FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, FSC-POL-01-001, FSC POLICY 
FOR PILOT TESTS OF DRAFT FSC STANDARDS (2004)); Certification Bodies’/Certificate Holders’ 
Transparency, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://fsc.org/en/transparency-certification-
bodies-certificate-holders [https://perma.cc/H36A-TYSX]. 
 113. See U.S. FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, supra note 110, § 10, at 18–19. 
 114. See id. § 19, at 23. 
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stewardship, formally undergo review and potential revision on a five-year cy-
cle.115  
B. Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI) 
 The American Forest & Paper Association (AFPA) launched the Sustaina-
ble Forestry Initiative (SFI) in 1995 as “a voluntary code of conduct for the 
members” of the trade association.116 By 1998, the program was opened to for-
ests owned by individuals or entities that were not part of AFPA.117 By 2000, 
responsibility for the program shifted entirely to an independent nonprofit or-
ganization, where it now resides.118 Unlike FSC, which is a global certification 
program with regional variation in standards, SFI is a certification program 
aimed specifically at forests in Canada and the United States.119 
 SFI standards fall into four categories: forest management; fiber sourcing; 
chain of custody; and on-product labels.120 Each type of standard begins with a 
common set of principles, such as: sustainable forestry; forest productivity and 
health; water quality protection; biodiversity; aesthetics and recreation; legal 
compliance; community engagement and social responsibility; transparency; 
and continuous improvement.121 Much as with FSC, these general principles are 
then elaborated in greater detail with steps to take to fulfill each principle.122 For 
example, with SFI’s forest management standard, the principles are followed by 
15 objectives (e.g., forest management planning, forest health and productivity, 
legal and regulatory compliance), each of which are followed by a set of more 
concrete indicators.123 Overall, the forest management standard bears much 
affinity with the plan-do-check-act structure of an ISO-certified EMS, although 
applied to forest management. It is generally thought that the SFI’s standards 
provide forest managers with greater flexibility than do the FSC standards, the 
latter being commonly described as more prescriptive than SFI’s standards.124 
 SFI’s standards are reviewed every five years and updated as needed 
through a process that begins with an external review panel comprising outside 
                                                                                                                               
 115. U.S. FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, supra note 88, at 4. 
 116. R. Neil Sampson, The Sustainable Forestry Initiative Program: Seven Years of 
Sustainable Forestry, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. UNITED NATIONS, http://www.fao.org/3/XII/0700-
A1.htm [https://perma.cc/KGL3-87VQ].  
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Introduction to SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY INITIATIVE, SFI 2015–2019 STANDARDS AND 
RULES (2015) 1–2, https://forests.org/wp-content/uploads/2015_2019StandardsandRules_web_Feb 
_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/LZY6-57K9]. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. SFI 2015-2019 Forest Management Standard, in SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY INITIATIVE, 
supra note 120, at 1. 
 124. See, e.g., CONG. RES. SERV., R41992, FOREST CERTIFICATION PROGRAMS 2 (2011), 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41992/6 [https://perma.cc/ZN63-YLYU]. (“The SFI 
standard is generally more flexible, while the FSC standard is generally more prescriptive with more 
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experts from the public and private sectors and from academe.125 Public com-
ments are elicited, as the review process is announced on the SFI’s website and 
communicated to various stakeholders identified by the SFI.126 Standard setting 
includes a public review process and recommendations from multi-stakeholder 
committees and revision workshops in North America.127  
 As with FSC, the process of certification relies on a third-party audit from 
an accredited organization.128 Currently about seven accredited certifiers exist 
that can audit conformity with SFI’s forest management standards, and four cer-
tifiers can audit its chain of custody standard.129 Forest owners or product com-
panies seeking certification identify and compensate their auditor.130 
C. Efficacy of Forest Certification Programs 
 An initial way to consider the impact of forest certification programs is to 
look at how much forested land has been certified. In the United States, roughly 
35 million acres of land were certified under FSC’s U.S. program in 2018.131 
This may sound like a great deal of land but, to put this figure in perspective, 
consider that the United States has about 800 million acres of overall forested 
land, upwards of about 60 percent of which is privately owned.132 This means 
that no more than about 8 percent of all private forests in the United States are 
certified under the FSC program.133  
                                                                                                                               
 125. Introduction to SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY INITIATIVE, supra note 120, at 1. 
 126. SFI Standards Development and Interpretations Process, in SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY 
INITIATIVE, supra note 120, at 3. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Introduction to SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY INITIATIVE, supra note 120, at 1. 
 129. Id. at 3. 
 130. SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY INITIATIVE, HOW TO CERTIFY TO THE SFI STANDARDS 2 (Dec. 
2017), https://forests.org/wp-content/uploads/HowtoCertify_SFI_Dec1.pdf [https://perma.cc/N435 
-BSHJ]. 
 131. Facts & Figures, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://us.fsc.org/en-us/what-we-do/ 
facts-figures [https://web.archive.org/web/20180825102005/https://us.fsc.org/en-us/what-we-do/facts 
-figures]. For one gauge of the rate of growth in land covered by an FSC certification, consider that 
in 2011, 33 million acres were under certified management. CONG. RES. SERV., supra note 124, at 
3 (2011).  
 132. National Woodland Owner Survey, supra note 82. This survey is the latest sustainable 
forest report issued by the federal government. 
 133. The percentage of forests under certified management is a relevant measure because it 
focuses on the ultimate problem that FSC aims to solve: the degradation or elimination of forested 
lands. CARY COGLIANESE, MEASURING REGULATORY PERFORMANCE: EVALUATING THE IMPACT 
OF REGULATION AND REGULATORY POLICY (2012), https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/ 
1_coglianese%20web.pdf [https://perma.cc/3U2D-476N]. See generally Auld et al., supra note 77, 
at 188 (indicating that measures of “effectiveness of forest certification [focusing on] the degree to 
which [it] modifies on-the-ground practices in ways that are likely to reverse or alleviate environ-
mental deterioration and socioeconomic harm resulting from forestry” are ones that are “commonly 
used” and “appropriate”). It is conceivable, of course, to consider how well FSC is faring earlier in 
the causal chain—such as how much the furniture industry is selling products with wood harvested 
from sustainable forests. The Sustainable Furnishings Council (SFC) has partnered with the Na-
tional Wildlife Federation (NWF) to produce a scorecard of furniture companies’ efforts to under-
take actions to promote the use of recycled wood and wood from FSC-certified forests. Wood 
Furniture Scorecard 2019, SUSTAINABLE FURNISHINGS COUNCIL, https://furniturescorecard.nwf. 
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 When considered from a global perspective, about 500 million acres of for-
ested land across 82 countries are certified through FSC.134 Yet, overall the 
planet has about 11 billion acres of forested land—meaning that FSC-certified 
forests make up no more than 5 percent of the world’s forests.135  
Of the total acres certified under FSC globally, 51 percent are located in 
Europe, while 33 percent can be found in North America.136 The U.S. share 
makes up roughly 21 percent of all certified forests in North America and about 
7 percent of the total certified worldwide.137  
 According to SFI’s latest annual report, the percentage of North American 
forested land falling under its certification is somewhat greater: 364 million 
acres throughout the United States and Canada.138 Compared with a combined 
1.6 billion acres of forests overall in the United States and Canada, SFI’s cov-
erage amounts to about 20 percent of total forested land.139 SFI’s recent reports 
do not break down the program’s coverage separately for the United States ver-
sus Canada, so it is not possible to discern exactly how much forest in each 
                                                                                                                               
org/wood-furniture-scorecard-2019 [https://perma.cc/2JK4-PNHS]. Of the 82 furniture companies 
listed in the 2019 scorecard, 62 percent do not even achieve an honorable mention—that is, 5 points 
out of total of 26 points. On the other hand, 21 companies are considered top scorers, while 10 have 
received honorable mentions. But keep in mind that companies with even 12 points—or less than 
50% of the points possible—count as “top scorers.” Those having earned 5–11 points receive an 
“honorable mention.” Id. Although the scorecard does not assign market share to each company, it 
would at least appear that most companies in the furniture industry are not pushing the envelope in 
terms of sustainability.  
 134. See FSC Facts & Figures, U.S. FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL (Nov. 21, 2019), https:// 
fsc.org/sites/fsc.org/files/2019-11/Facts_and_Figures_2019-11-21.pdf#viewer.action=download [h 
ttps://perma.cc/93NX-8VE7]; see also FSC, FSC ANNUAL REPORT 2019, at 40 (2019) [hereinafter 
FSC ANNUAL REPORT], https://fsc.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/FSC%20ANNUAL%20REPOR 
T%202019%20ENGLISH%20web.pdf [https://perma.cc/NFR9-KAW7]. 
 135. The State of the World’s Forests, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. UNITED NATIONS FOOD & 
AGRIC., http://www.fao.org/state-of-forests/en/ [https://perma.cc/5Y56-NV5H]. See generally ORG. 
OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S FORESTS: FOREST PATHWAYS TO 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2018) [hereinafter FAO 2018 REPORT], http://www.fao.org/docume 
nts/card/en/c/I9535EN (follow “Download” hyperlink).  
 136. FSC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 134, at 40. The annual report lists forest area in terms 
of hectares; one hectare equals 2.47 acres. 
 137. Approximately 164 million acres of North America forestlands are FSC-certified. Id. In-
cidentally, if one considers FSC’s reach in terms of the number of owners of land who have obtained 
certification, FSC’s penetration is dramatically smaller. The total number of FSC certifications that 
have been issued globally is about 1,700, with about 40,000 chain-of-custody certificates. Id. at 40–
41. By way of comparison, consider that in the United States there are about 11 million owners of 
forest land alone; almost all of these are family owners, but 1 million are commercial owners. See 
U.S. FOREST SERV., WHO OWNS AMERICA’S FORESTS? FOREST OWNERSHIP PATTERNS AND 
FAMILY FOREST HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE NATIONAL WOODLAND OWNER SURVEY 2–3 (2008), https: 
//www.nrs.fs.fed.us/pubs/inf/NRS-INF-06-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/LU3K-JU73]. 
 138. SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY INITIATIVE, FORESTS OF OPPORTUNITY 13 (2019), https://www.sf 
iprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/SFI-ProgressReport-2019_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/7B7A-BJYY]. 
 139. For the acreage of forested land in the United States and Canada, see FOOD & AGRIC. 
ORG. UNITED NATIONS FOOD & AGRIC., GLOBAL FOREST RESOURCES ASSESSMENT 2020: KEY 
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country is covered by current levels of SFI certification. However, it has previ-
ously been reported that SFI certification covers only 7.7 percent of U.S. for-
ested land.140 
 As some forests can be certified under more than one system, political sci-
entist Lars Gulbrandsen has adjusted for such dual-certified forests.141 He esti-
mates that roughly 11 percent of  the world’s forests fall under at least one form 
of sustainable forest management certification.142  
 Of course, not all forested land is used for timber harvesting or other indus-
trial purposes. The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) views “the 
forest industry” overall as having “made significant progress in improving sus-
tainability over the last years, and use of products from sustainably-managed 
forests is increasing.”143 The FAO notes that “[i]n 2017 the annual volume of 
wood harvested in FSC-certified forests . . . corresponded to 23 percent of the 
total volume of global industrial roundwood production and 11 percent of global 
roundwood production (including fuelwood).”144 According to a global alliance 
known as the Program for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC)—
which effectively certifies national forestry certification programs—the total 
amount of industrial wood production that is covered either by FSC certification 
or another PEFC-endorsed certification amounts to 38 percent.145 A survey of 
hardwood lumber manufacturers in the United States revealed that no more than 
about 29 percent had received chain-of-custody certification—and these were 
about evenly split between FSC and SFI.146 
 As with ISO 14001, some empirical studies have attempted to answer key 
questions about the impact of forest certification systems: Do forests managed 
under certified systems actually fare better than those not under certification? If 
so, has the existence of a certification system caused the improvements? Survey 
research does indicate that forests that meet certification standards are self-
reported to be managed in a more rigorous and environmentally conscientious 
manner.147 Nevertheless, as legal scholar Errol Meidinger has observed, “we do 
                                                                                                                               
 140. Omar Espinoza et al., Forest Certification and Green Building Standards: Overview and 
Use in the U.S. Hardwood Industry, 33 J. CLEANER PROD. 30, 33 tbl.2 (2012). Of the SFI certified 
lands in the United States, 30% are owned by fifteen states. SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY INITIATIVE, 
supra note 138. 
 141. See Lars H. Gulbrandsen, Public Sector Engagement with Private Governance 
Programmes: Interactions and Evolutionary Effects in Forest and Fisheries Certification, in SMART 
MIXES FOR TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL HARM 211, 221 (Judith van Erp et al. eds., 2019).  
 142. Id. 
 143. FAO 2018 REPORT, supra note 135, at 50. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Espinoza et al., supra note 140, at 37. 
 147. See, e.g., Zuzana Burivalova et al., A Critical Comparison of Conventional, Certified, 
and Community Management of Tropical Forests for Timber in Terms of Environmental, Economic, 
and Social Variables, 10 CONSERVATION LETTERS 4 (2017); Susan E. Moore et al., Impacts of 
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI) Forest Certification in 
North America, 110 J. FORESTRY 79, 80 (2012).  
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not have and are not likely to get anything approximating scientifically persua-
sive information on the efficacy of forest certification programs.”148 The same 
sorts of challenges that exist with respect to evaluating EMS standards exist with 
respect to forest standards.149 As the standards are nonbinding, the forest com-
panies that adopt certified forest management practices may well be unlike other 
actors. Indeed, they could well be the very companies that would manage their 
forests more responsibly even in the absence of a certification system.  
 Another potential limitation in the impact of forestry certification appears 
to be the tendency for its use most frequently in those parts of the world with 
less intense pressures for deforestation—or at least where such pressures stem 
mainly from the use of timber for the sale of wood and paper products, rather 
than other sources of deforestation, such as agriculture. FSC forest management 
certification is simply not present in many countries with significant rates of 
deforestation; after all, less than half of the countries in the world have any FSC-
certified land.150 Social scientists Axel Marx and Dieter Cuypers have found that 
“certification is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for halting defor-
estation in a given country.”151 In many parts of the world, after all, deforestation 
stems from a desire to clear land for agricultural use, not for the sale of timber—
making the entire certification mechanism simply ill fitted for a major source of 
global deforestation.  
 The upshot appears to be that, while forest management certification may 
be better than nothing, or at least not harmful, it does not seem to be a major 
force for preserving forest resources around the world. Political scientist Lars 
Gulbranden concludes his book-length study of voluntary certification systems 
by observing that, “[o]n balance, although certification seems to change some 
management practices and create better environmental outcomes in some cases, 
it does not seem to be an effective environmental institution in the sense of ad-
dressing some of the most serious environmental challenges in the forest and 
fisheries sectors.”152 
                                                                                                                               
 148. Meidinger, supra note 83; see also Auld et al., supra note 77; Zuzana Burivalova et al., 
What Works in Tropical Forest Conservation, and What Does Not: Effectiveness of Four Strategies 
in Terms of Environmental, Social, and Economic Outcomes, CONSERVATION SCI. & PRAC., June 
2019, art. no. e28, at 1 (2019). Burivalova and her coauthors note:  
The main roadblocks in understanding the effectiveness of different types of [forest] conservation 
strategies are rooted in the complexity of the socio‐economic systems in which conservation is im-
plemented, imperfect implementation of conservation measures, lack of funding for appropriate eval-
uation, and the near impossibility of doing true experiments (because of large scale and complex 
conditions), among others.  
See id. at 2. 
 149. See supra notes 67–68, 70 and accompanying text. 
 150. See Facts & Figures, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://www.fsc.org/en/facts-
figures [http://perma.cc/3JR6-US2F]. 
 151. Axel Marx & Dieter Cuypers, Forest Certification as a Global Environmental 
Governance Tool: What Is the Macro-Effectiveness of the Forest Stewardship Council?, 4 REGUL. 
& GOVERNANCE 408, 416 (2010).  
 152. LARS H. GULBRANDSEN, TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: THE 
EMERGENCE AND EFFECTS OF THE CERTIFICATION OF FORESTS AND FISHERIES 180 (2010); see also 
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III. GREEN BUILDING DESIGN 
 Most people spend the majority of their days in buildings, making buildings 
a major source of society’s energy consumption (an estimated 30 to 40 percent) 
and an important factor affecting individual health.153 Yet, even though the fed-
eral government has many hard law regulations designed to address the outdoor 
environment and major consumer products (e.g., automobiles), no comprehen-
sive set of federal regulations applies to the built environment. For the last 
twenty years, however, an important source of soft law has emerged: Leadership 
in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) certification of “green building” 
design.154 LEED certification entails a ranking system according to which build-
ings can be designated a level (certified, silver, gold, or platinum) based on 
whether they meet certain green building criteria.155 LEED standards are estab-
lished by, and the certification is administered through, the U.S. Green Building 
Council (USGBC)—a nonprofit membership organization headquartered in 
Washington, D.C.156 Members include building developers, homeowners, and 
city planners.157 Buildings that receive LEED certification can display a special 
logo in the building indicating the level of attainment.158 
 USGBC first created LEED in 1998, beginning with 19 pilot projects.159 
The program originally focused just on the commercial building sector.160 Using 
                                                                                                                               
Council Certification in Mexico, 89 J. ENV’T ECON. & MGMT. 306–33 (2018) (failing to find evi-
dence of a reduction in deforestation from certification); Laura Villalobos, Jessica Coria & Anna 
Nordén, Has Forest Certification Reduced Forest Degradation in Sweden? 94 LAND ECON. 220, 
220 (2018) (concluding that “certification has not halted forest degradation in that it has not im-
proved any of the environmental outcomes”). Other efforts to synthesize the relevant empirical lit-
erature reach similar conclusions. See, e.g., Hamish van der Ven & Benjamin Cashore, Forest 
Certification: The Challenge of Measuring Impacts, 32 CURRENT OP. ENV’T SUSTAINABILITY 104 
(2018); Ingrid J.Visseren-Hamakers & Philipp Pattberg, We Can’t See the Forest for the Trees: The 
Environmental Impact of Global Forest Certification Is Unknown, 22 GAIA 25 (2013); Claudia 
Romero et al., An Overview of Current Knowledge About the Impacts of Forest Management 
Certification (Ctr. for Int’l Forestry Rsch., Occasional Paper No. 91, 2013), http://www.cifor.org/ 
publications/pdf_files/OccPapers/OP-91.pdf [https://perma.cc/8D7M-Y9WX]; Michael Rawson Clark 
& Joelyn Sarrah Kozar, Comparing Sustainable Forest Management Certifications Standards: A 
Meta-Analysis, Ecology & Soc’y, Mar. 2011, art. no. 3, at 1. 
 153. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, QUADRENNIAL TECHNOLOGY REVIEW: AN ASSESSMENT OF 
ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 145, 151 (2015), https://www.energy. 
gov/sites/prod/files/2017/03/f34/qtr-2015-chapter5.pdf [https://perma.cc/GXF8-UXTH]; see also 
How Much Energy Is Consumed in U.S. Buildings? Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=86&t=1 [https://perma.cc/XN38-32HU]. 
 154. Leadership in Energy & Environmental Design, LEED, http://leed.usgbc.org/leed.html 
[https://perma.cc/J8UA-B24K]. 
 155. Id.  
 156. Overview, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, https://www.usgbc.org/organizations/us-green-
building-council [https://perma.cc/3ADH-6UH6]. 
 157. See Organizations, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, https://www.usgbc.org/organizations 
[https://perma.cc/H43B-K4KB]. 
 158. Leadership in Energy & Environmental Design, supra note 154. 
 159. Jacob Kriss, From a Simple Idea to a Several-Hundred-Billion-Dollar Industry, U.S. 
GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL (Feb. 20, 2014), https://www.usgbc.org/articles/simple-idea-several-
hundred-billion-dollar-industry [https://perma.cc/HK9G-83MA]. 
 160. Id. 
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lessons and information from the pilot program, USGBC launched a new ver-
sion of LEED—LEED 2.0—in March 2001.161 In 2003, the U.S. General Ser-
vices Administration began to require that all new federal building projects meet 
LEED Certified standards.162 Today, GSA requires all new federal construction 
projects to meet LEED Gold certification.163 Many private companies have sim-
ilarly committed to meeting LEED standards for new construction. LEED also 
now has green building standards for residential homes.164 
 Although LEED certification originated in the United States and is most 
popular here, it is now administered around the world.165 Across both the public 
and private sectors, 79,000 projects throughout 160 countries and territories 
have been certified to meet LEED standards.166 This amounts reportedly to over 
15 billion square feet of building space.167  
 As LEED has grown in popularity, USGBC has modified its standards.168 
Using the Environmental Protection Agency’s Tool for the Reduction and As-
sessment of Chemical and Other Environmental Impacts (TRACI) as well as 
measurement weightings from the National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy, USGBC began to use what it describes as “objective scientific intentions 
behind the assigned credit values.”169 In 2009, it unveiled new LEED stand-
ards,170 and, in November 2013, it launched its latest version known as LEED 
v4.171 This version encourages using products with socially beneficial lifecycles 
                                                                                                                               
 161. Id. 
 162. Jacob Kriss, Part 2: A Green Building Explosion (2003–2009), U.S. GREEN BLDG. 
COUNCIL (Feb. 27, 2014), https://www.usgbc.org/articles/part-2-green-building-explosion-2003-
2009 [https://perma.cc/U64D-8G3M]. 
 163. LEED Building Information, U.S. GEN. SERVICES ADMIN., https://www.gsa.gov/real-
estate/design-construction/design-excellence/sustainability/sustainable-design/leed-building-informati 
on [https://perma.cc/PZ57-YSDA].  
 164. USGBC initially launched green building standards for residential homes around 2005. 
See Jennie Richards, Green Building: A Retrospective on the History of LEED Certification, INST. 
FOR ENV’T ENTREPRENEURSHIP 2 (Sept. 2012), https://enviroinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2012/09/GREEN-BUILDING-A-Retrospective-History-of-LEED-Certification-November-2012.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A7FJ-8SK8]. For information about residential LEED, see LEED for Residential 
Design and Construction, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, https://www.usgbc.org/leed/rating-
systems/ residential [https://perma.cc/GQ85-EQCJ]. 
 165. Sarah Stanley, U.S. Green Building Council Announces Top 10 Countries and Regions 
for LEED Green Building, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.usgbc.org/ 
articles/us-green-building-council-announces-top-10-countries-and-regions-leed-green-building [https 
://perma.cc/VYH2-V5BN]; Alison Gregor, Two Polar Opposites Cities Take the Lead in 
Environmental Design, USGBC+ (Jan./Feb. 2015), https://plus.usgbc.org/global-leed/ [https://per 
ma.cc/D9ZR-NSZT]. 
 166. See Leadership in Energy & Environmental Design, supra note 154. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Kriss, supra note 162. 
 169. Id. 
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 171. Jacob Kriss, Part 3: Challenges and Opportunities (2010–Present), U.S. GREEN BLDG. 
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and seeks to reach new markets, such as “data centers, warehouses and distribu-
tion centers, hospitality, and midrise residential structures.”172 
 LEED certification is built around standards for nine facets of building de-
sign, such as energy consumption and building materials.173 Certification is 
based on the accumulation of points for each of these facets.174 The points are 
based on specific criteria related to each facet, and these criteria vary for differ-
ent project types, such as existing buildings, new construction, schools, retail, 
homes, and healthcare facilities.175 There are a total of 100 points available and 
the number of points determines the rating level the project receives: Certified 
(40–49 points), Silver (50–59 points), Gold (60–79 points), or Platinum (80+ 
points).176 In addition to the stated criteria, up to 10 bonus points are possible 
for “innovation in design, exemplary performance, or achievement of credits 
identified as having regional importance in a project’s location.”177 
 The criteria or standards for the LEED point system are “[d]eveloped in a 
transparent, consensus-based process that includes several rounds of public 
comments and approval from USGBC members.”178 For these standards to be 
created, there must be a public comment period and a voting process undertaken 
by USGBC’s membership.179 A LEED Steering Committee (LSC) oversees any 
changes and development of LEED through several responsibilities. This com-
mittee is made up of a balance of members representing different interests and 
groups, with the goal being that one specific group does not constitute more than 
25% of the LSC members.180 
 When it comes to a specific building project and how it obtains certifica-
tion, the process is based on a review of documentation submitted online by the 
                                                                                                                               
updated portions of LEED v4 with LEED v4.1 (announced in January 2019, with a further adden-
dum made in November 2020). Sarah Stanley, USGBC Opens Registration for LEED v4.1 for New 
Construction and Interior Spaces, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL (Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.usgbc. 
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.cc/FC7B-MCU6]; Paula Melton, Big Changes Hit in v4.1 Addenda for Q4 2020, LEEDUSER: BLOG 
(Dec. 14, 2020), https://leeduser.buildinggreen.com/blog/big-changes-hit-v41-addenda-q4-2020 
[https://perma.cc/DS64-SYHB]. 
 172. Id. 
 173. These facets are Integrative Process, Location and Transportation, Sustainable Sites, Wa-
ter Efficiency, Energy and Atmosphere, Materials and Resources, Indoor Environmental Quality, 
Innovation, and Regional Priorities. Leadership in Energy & Environmental Design, supra note 154. 
 174. Id. 
 175. U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, FOUNDATIONS OF LEED 3 (2009), https://www.usgbc.org/ 
sites/default/files/foundations-of-LEED.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Z6X-2ZTQ]. 
 176. Id. at 7. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Leadership in Energy & Environmental Design, supra note 154. 
 179. Kriss, supra note 171. 
 180. The represented groups include “(i) property/building owners (including government), 
developers, brokers; (ii) architectural/engineering firms, specifiers, urban planners, and designers; 
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note 175, at 12. 
 
 Environmental Soft Law as a Governance Strategy 
 
 
FORTHCOMING VOLUME 61 JURIMETRICS 27 
project’s manager. The manager first registers with USGBC, selecting the ap-
plicable rating system, such as LEED v4 O+M for existing buildings or LEED 
v4 Homes for residential buildings.181 Registration fees vary based on the type 
and size of a project.182 For a project manager who is a nonmember of USGBC 
and is putting up a new commercial building, the cost is $1,500 for registration 
and $5,000 for precertification, with the additional cost for certification depend-
ent on the building’s size.183  
 Once the project is registered, the manager submits all the documentation 
materials online.184 A separate entity, Green Building Certification Inc. (GBCI), 
then reviews these materials.185 Within several weeks, GBCI makes an initial 
decision about which level of certification has been met, but the project manager 
is afforded several additional weeks to submit supplementary information or to 
amend the initial application.186 At this point, GBCI will only “review revised 
or newly submitted prerequisites and credits, and reconsider any anticipated 
credits or prerequisites for which information has changed since the return of 
the preliminary review.”187 The project team can accept these final review re-
sults or revise the application and resubmit it through an appeal.188 Appeals can 
be essentially unlimited but they do require payment of additional fees.189  
 As of 2020, the cumulative number of certified LEED projects in the United 
States stood at 37,840, covering about 5.7 million square feet.190 (Of these, 6% 
were certified as platinum, 37% as gold, 34% as silver, and 22% as simply cer-
tified.191) By way of perspective, the United States claims an estimated 5.9 mil-
lion commercial buildings within its borders, covering a total of 97 billion 
square feet.192 This means that the number of LEED certified projects in the 
United States amount to about six-tenths of one percent of all buildings in the 
United States. In terms of square footage, LEED certified projects amount to 
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only six-thousandths of one percent of all the commercial square footage in the 
United States.193  
 Evaluations of LEED have encountered many of the same issues as with 
other soft law initiatives, such as selection bias from the voluntary nature of 
adoption.194 In addition, just as with ISO 14001, concerns have been raised in 
the context of LEED about building owners simply going through the motions—
that is, engaging in mere “window dressing”195—without seriously improving 
the environment.196 LEED has been subjected to charges that building managers 
can “game the system”—or, as one architect has put it, they can go “after low-
hanging fruit to rack up scores, even if underlying measures don’t result in en-
vironmental improvements.”197 
LEED also presents two other distinctive issues when it comes to evaluating 
its impact. First, LEED buildings are by definition new, which presents chal-
lenges when their energy consumption is compared to older non-LEED build-
ings. Newer buildings can probably be expected to be more energy efficient, 
even without LEED, as they make use of newer technologies (e.g., newer 
HVAC, lighting, insulation) that will be already more energy efficient, regard-
less of whether a building is LEED-certified. Thus, even if newer LEED build-
ings are more energy efficient than older non-LEED buildings, it cannot be 
inferred that all the energy efficiency gains in the former stem from LEED.  
 Second, LEED certification is based on how a building is designed, not 
what it in fact achieves by way of energy consumption in use. It is also based 
only on documentation, not on actual measurement of performance.198 Yet these 
differences can matter. It is one thing to certify a building as energy efficient 
based on how it has been built and is intended to function; it is quite another 
                                                                                                                               
 193. As a fraction of new building construction, the proportion that is LEED-certified is cer-
tainly larger—but still quite small. See Jeroen van der Heijden, On the Potential of Voluntary 
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label to date. See supra notes 173–174 and accompanying text. 
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whether those intentions are actually fulfilled.199 It is conceivable, for example, 
that occupants of LEED buildings might modify a more energy efficient build-
ing’s temperature levels to be cooler in the summer and warmer in the winter, 
potentially offsetting some of the anticipated reductions in energy consumption. 
 Many studies have examined LEED standards and their impact.200 Some of 
these “have indicated that LEED-certified buildings do not outperform conven-
tional buildings in terms of energy usage or greenhouse gas emissions and in 
certain examples they even seem to perform worse.”201  
 An article published in the journal Sustainability may provide the most con-
cise distillation of what is known at this time. Reviewing the available empirical 
studies that considered whether LEED-certified buildings were in fact more en-
ergy efficient in practice, the researchers characterized the existing literature as 
“contradictory.”202 In ten studies, results were consistent with the view that 
LEED buildings are more energy efficient in practice; however, eight studies 
reported results indicating that they could not be shown to be more efficient—
and indeed that sometimes the LEED-certified buildings were actually less en-
ergy efficient.203 It goes without saying that more research is needed. 
IV. COMMONALITIES, ADVANTAGES, AND CHALLENGES 
 In this Article, I have provided three case studies of environmental soft law 
governance. Although numerous other nongovernmental and governmental vol-
untary standards and programs could also be considered, the three cases pre-
sented here have been among the most widely diffused and studied of any 
voluntary environmental initiatives. They also provide an opportunity to offer 
three concluding observations about the commonalities, advantages, and chal-
lenges of environmental soft law governance. 
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 First, given the different domains and objectives of the three cases exam-
ined in this Article, it is not surprising that the details of their design and imple-
mentation are also different. Nevertheless, despite these differences, the three 
cases reveal a set of commonalities that are more broadly found across still other 
examples of soft law governance. Several of these common characteristics stand 
out: 
• Consensus-driven processes. The applicable guiding norms or standards in 
each of the cases presented here are based on a consensus formed among 
a limited but diverse set of actors. Included among those involved in es-
tablishing the standards in these cases are those businesses to whom they 
would ultimately apply.  
• Normative iteration. All of the standards are subject to a periodic review 
and modification. Each of the nongovernmental systems explicitly pro-
vides for a regular updating process. 
• Third-party certification. Certification of compliance with the applicable 
standards are made by third-party entities.  
• Governance competition. Multiple voluntary standards addressing the 
same environmental concerns or business domains develop and then “com-
pete” for members. This has been evident with the British and EMAS al-
ternatives to ISO 14001, with the multiple forest certification regimes, and 
even with green building design, where USGBC has had its share of alter-
natives too (e.g., Green Globes or EnergyStar for buildings).204 
These commonalities may allow for some cautious generalizations to be 
drawn from the three case studies in this Article. 
 Second, soft law systems with these kinds of commonalities hold a variety 
of potential advantages that make them appealing, especially for issues that oth-
erwise seem intractable to resolve through hard law. Some of these possible ad-
vantages are as follows: 
• Soft law governance may be more feasible, as it does not require political 
action by gridlocked legislative bodies and it can accommodate standards 
established under uncertainty (because they are not subject to any judicial 
review). 
• Soft law governance may be more adaptable over time, precisely because 
it is more feasible. 
• Soft law governance may be less costly for target organizations to comply 
with, or at least the voluntary nature of compliance means that firms will 
only comply when they see that doing so will be net beneficial to them. 
• Soft law governance may promote greater buy-in and legitimacy because 
of its participatory and voluntary nature. 
• Soft law governance may provide a proving ground for new innovations, as 
voluntary initiatives can reward environmental leaders for experimentation and 
for their efforts to go beyond compliance with hard law. 
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• Soft law governance, by holding open competition from different stand-
ards, might produce a “race-to-the-top” effect, leading either to the sur-
vival of the most credible system or at least fostering increased rigor across 
competitors.205 
• Soft law governance may help in diffusing best practices and bolstering 
social norms which, if sufficiently embedded in practice, could ultimately 
prove more effective than hard law.206  
• Soft law governance may provide a basis for linking to and reinforcing 
hard law, such as when government procurement standards require bidding 
firms to be certified to meet otherwise voluntary standards. 
This is not to suggest that all soft law governance systems offer all of these 
advantages, nor is it to say that they could even be reasonably expected to do so. But 
these potential advantages are what typically make soft law so appealing, especially 
for addressing problems that seem intractable or that otherwise go unaddressed. 
 Finally, whatever promise that soft law governance holds must be weighed 
against its potential downsides or limitations. Some of these limitations have 
been evident in this Article’s consideration of evidence about what, if any, im-
proved environmental outcomes have emerged from the soft law programs in 
the three case studies. No consideration of soft law governance, in any policy 
domain, should proceed without considering possibilities such as the following: 
• Soft law governance may amount merely to “greenwashing” (or its equiv-
alent). Many soft law environmental governance systems are like ISO 
14001 in that they require management steps, processes, and documenta-
tion, without necessarily requiring the documented and consistent attain-
ment of actual results. LEED raises a similar concern in that it documents 
design elements, not actual performance in use. The potential for green-
washing in connection with firms’ participation in voluntary environmen-
tal programs should not be unduly discounted.207 
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• Soft law governance may only have a modest impact on the overarching 
problems it seeks to solve because it is, well, soft. A soft law system de-
pends on other external or internal motivations, rather than providing much 
of an incentive on its own. The scope of participation in a voluntary regime 
might thus be quite limited and the actual achievements of those businesses 
that participate might be limited as well.208 
• Soft law governance may prove only deceptively successful because of se-
lection bias—attracting those participants that were already more environ-
mentally committed.209 
• Soft law governance, by holding open competition from different stand-
ards, might produce a race to the bottom—or, at least, the proliferation of 
competing standards might undercut the force of any one of them or reduce 
their signaling value to others. 
• Soft law governance’s success may depend ultimately on the background 
threat of hard law. The apparent success of at least one voluntary water 
pollution program, for example, has been shown to have been effective 
mainly because of the backdrop of threats of enforcement actions.210 Many 
other soft law programs have been adopted with hard law lurking or loom-
ing in the background—even if only in the shadows—and it may be that 
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the hard law is responsible for some substantial portion of any success that 
soft law governance may appear to have had.211 
• Soft law governance may serve to stave off or undercut the needed political 
support for more effective hard law interventions. To the extent that soft 
law governance interventions are more symbolic than substantive, the pos-
sibility that such voluntary programs could siphon off support for more 
meaningful hard law interventions should be considered.  
Again, this is not to suggest that all of these downsides will be real or realized 
in practice. Rather, it is to recommend that any effort to think hard about the 
reliance on soft law as a solution for difficult public problems should at least 
entertain that the outcomes from voluntary standards may not prove to be as 
grand as their biggest enthusiasts might hope. 
 In the end, policy choices are comparative. That means that policy decision-
makers must think about how soft law governance compares with hard law gov-
ernance—and about how specific forms of soft and hard law governance com-
pare with each other. With respect to some problems or facets of problems, and 
under certain conditions, soft law may well compare favorably to hard law, or 
at least may work productively to complement hard law approaches. But not 
always. Decisions about governance ultimately demand making normative 
judgments, often undertaken under conditions of uncertainty, and they can and 
should be informed by careful analysis, available evidence, and an attempt to 
anticipate what otherwise might remain unanticipated consequences. 
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